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1. COORDINATION OF COMPANY TAXES IN THE EU: THE NEVER-
ENDING DEBATE
The creation of a level playing ﬁeld for business competition is a basic goal of the Eu-
ropean common market. Does this require a harmonization or at least an approximation
of corporate tax systems in the European Union? Almost since the signing of the Treaty
of Rome in 1957, European policy makers have been debating this issue.
In the fall of 2001 the European Commission made a new contribution to this perennial
debate by issuing its report on ”Company Taxation in the Internal Market” (Commission,
2001a). In three ways this report marked an important reorientation of the Commission’s
strategy in the ﬁeld of company tax coordination. First, while previous Commission stud-
ies of this issue tended to focus on the need for approximation of corporate tax bases and
tax rates and on the desirability of adopting a common system of corporate-personal tax
integration in the EU, the new Commission report instead stresses the potential beneﬁts
of a consolidated tax base for European multinational enterprises, to be allocated across
EU member states through a system of formula apportionment. Second, whereas the pre-
vious report on European company taxation (the so-called Ruding Report of 1992) was
prepared by outside experts, the Commission Services have taken ﬁnal responsibility for
the new report, thereby signaling a greater degree of political commitment to company
tax reform. Third, in the policy communication accompanying the report, the Commis-
sion (2001b) endorses member state competition in corporate tax rates, thus distancing
itself from earlier notions of ”harmful” tax competition.
In this paper I will discuss some of the more ambitious proposals made in the recent
Commission study. A number of comments on the report have already been published,1
but the present paper emphasizes two themes which have received relatively little at-
tention in the debate on the Commission’s proposals. The ﬁrst issue is the nature and
direction of the international ﬁscal spillovers arising under a system of formula appor-
tionment versus the current system of separate accounting. The second and related issue
2is whether it is really time to give up the more conventional harmonization approaches
favoured by the Commission in the past.
The paper is structured as follows. In Part 2 I discuss the rationale for and the
problems involved in moving towards a consolidated corporate tax base, to be distributed
across member states through formula apportionment. In Part 3 I argue that all of the
Commission’s proposals in this area suﬀer from signiﬁcant shortcomings. Against this
background the rest of Part 3 discusses the pros and cons of corporate tax harmonization
as a long term strategy for company tax reform and presents some quantitative estimates
of the gains from harmonization. Part 4 sums up the main conclusions of the paper.
2. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF FORMULA APPORTION-
MENT?
2.1. The Commission proposals for a consolidated corporate tax base
The recent EU Commission report on company taxation has already been well sum-
marized by Michael Devereux (2003) in this journal, so the present overview can be very
brief. The main policy goal stressed in the report is the removal of company tax ob-
stacles to cross-border economic activity to promote the creation of an integrated single
market for doing business in Europe. For this purpose the report proposes a number
of targeted tax policy measures, but it also sketches four alternative ”comprehensive”
approaches aimed at creating a single corporate tax base for all of the EU-wide activities
of European multinational enterprises (MNEs).
A consolidated tax base would have several advantages: 1) It would eliminate the
need for European MNEs to deal with all of the diﬀerent national company tax systems
within the Union, thereby reducing the costs of tax compliance. 2) It would in principle
eliminate the need to identify the ”correct” transfer prices for transactions between re-
lated European entities within the same multinational group. Again this would reduce
the compliance costs of ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h ec o s t so ft a xa d m i n i s t r a t i o nf o rg o v e r n m e n t s .
3) A consolidated tax base would automatically allow the oﬀset of losses in one EU mem-
ber state against proﬁts made in another member state, thereby securing greater tax
neutrality between national and multinational groups of companies. 4) A single tax base
for all EU activities would eliminate unintended tax obstacles to cross-border mergers
and acquisitions arising from the present insuﬃcient coordination of member state capital
3gains tax rules.
Without committing to any particular system, the Commission report describes four
diﬀerent blueprints for achieving a single tax base for European multinationals. All of
the four systems eliminate the current practice of separate accounting based on the arm’s
length principle for individual entities within a multinational group. Instead, European
multinationals will calculate their EU-wide proﬁts under a consolidated tax base which
is allocated among member states according to a common formula reﬂecting the ﬁrm’s
economic activity in each member state. Under all of the four systems, national gov-
ernments can still apply their own corporate tax rate to their apportioned share of the
tax base. The report envisages that, at least in the beginning, only a subgroup of EU
member states may wish to adopt a consolidated tax base, in accordance with the new
Nice Treaty procedures for Enhanced Cooperation among subsets of member states. In
that case the single tax base for the MNEs opting for the system will only cover activities
in those countries which have joined the system. However, for convenience the wording
below assumes that all member states participate in the system.
The four alternative systems considered in the report are the following. i) Under
Home State Taxation EU multinationals are allowed to calculate their EU-wide income
according to the tax code of their home country where their headquarters are located.
The diﬀerent national tax systems will thus continue to coexist, but for their EU-wide
activity multinationals will only have to cope with the single tax code of their home
country. The system is optional: multinationals can choose to be taxed under the current
system of separate accounting, or they can choose Home State taxation. ii) A Common
Consolidated Tax Base involves the creation of a common corporate tax base for all EU
multinationals opting for the system. Domestic companies and multinationals which
do not opt for the system will continue to be taxed under the current national tax
systems based on separate accounting for MNEs. iii) A European Union Company Tax
is economically equivalent to the Common Consolidated Tax Base, but while the latter
system is supposed to be administered by national governments, the European Union
Company Tax is administered at the EU level, with some or all of the revenue going
directly into the EU budget. iv) A Compulsory Harmonised Corporate Tax Base implies
a single corporate tax base for all EU ﬁrms, domestic as well as international. The system
4is mandatory for all companies, and national rules deﬁning the corporate tax base cease
to exist.
2.2. The case for formula apportionment
As already mentioned, all of the above systems of company taxation require that
the EU-wide corporate tax base be allocated across member states according to a ﬁxed
formula, assumed to be common for all countries. The fact that the EU Commission now
seems committed to formula apportionment (henceforth FA) is a remarkable development.
A couple of decades ago, European governments were highly critical of FA because they
felt that some U.S. states abused the system to ”overreach”, extending their tax base
beyond their natural jurisdiction by apportioning the worldwide income of multinational
groups doing business in the state. Moreover, the application of FA by national (as
opposed to subnational) governments is controversial in the context of the OECD which
is committed to the principle of separate accounting based on arm’s length pricing of
intragroup transactions.
However, because arm’s length prices are so hard to identify for specialized products
and services traded within multinational groups, taxation based on separate accounting
becomes increasingly vulnerable to income shifting via distorted transfer prices as the
volume of cross-border direct investment increases relative to total output. In reaction
to this, OECD governments have implemented complex rules for the setting of transfer
prices. Despite OECD eﬀorts at coordinating these rules, the various national rules are
not always consistent with each other, so MNEs sometimes ﬁnd that the diﬀerent juris-
dictions involved require diﬀerent transfer prices to be applied to the same intracompany
transaction. As a consequence, national tax bases sometimes overlap, generating double
taxation, and sometimes the uncoordinated national transfer pricing rules leave gaps in
the international tax base. Even apart from this, the diﬃculties of setting correct trans-
fer prices for products or services without any comparable open market price may cause
considerable costs of tax compliance and tax administration.
In principle - but with some important modiﬁcations to be discussed below - formula
apportionment will eliminate the need to determine transfer prices for the purpose of
allocating the corporate tax base across jurisdictions. In a setting of growing economic
integration, a switch from separate accounting to formula apportionment therefore seems
5increasingly attractive. It is telling that FA is used to allocate the corporate tax base at
the subnational level in the highly integrated national markets of federal countries like
the United States, Canada, Germany and Switzerland.
2.3. Allocating the corporate tax base: some technical issues
Like separate accounting based on arm’s length pricing, FA is a method for allocating
the tax base according to the ”source” of income. The Commission report mentions
a number of technical problems of designing a system of formula apportionment, but
it does not commit to any particular set of solutions. Broadly speaking, a system of
FA must specify rules for delineating the tax base to be apportioned; the formula for
allocating the tax base; and rules for measuring the factors in the formula. Since these
design problems have recently been surveyed by leading experts in the ﬁeld (see McLure
and Weiner, 2000; Weiner, 2001; Hellerstein and McLure, 2003), I will only comment on
selected issues which seem particularly important.
Delineating the apportionable tax base
The ﬁrst issue is how to delineate those groups of companies whose incomes should
be consolidated and subjected to formula apportionment. Policy makers can either take
an economic or a legal approach to this problem. Under the economic approach, a
business entity is included in a group for tax purposes if it is deemed to be economically
integrated with the other entities in the group. While this makes good sense from a
theoretical perspective, in practice it is very hard to ﬁnd clearcut measures of the degree
of economic integration between related companies. As argued by Hellerstein and McLure
(2003), it may therefore be safer to rely on a simple legal ownership test specifying that
two companies belong to the same group if one company owns at least X percent of the
shares in the other company.
EU policy makers must also decide whether they want to apportion the worldwide
income of EU multinationals, or whether they prefer to stop at the ”water’s edge”, ap-
portioning only the total income from EU sources. Stopping at the water’s edge seems
appropriate, since this will help to reduce tax coordination problems with countries out-
side the EU. Yet new coordination problems of a multilateral character may arise. For
example, suppose the US tax authorities decide to increase the transfer price of a product
delivered from a US aﬃliate to its French parent company, thereby raising the aﬃliate’s
6taxable proﬁts in the US. According to current tax treaty principles, the French author-
ities should then undertake an oﬀsetting downward adjustment of the taxable proﬁts of
the French parent company to prevent international double taxation. Under the present
system of separate accounting, this would be a matter solely between the US and France.
But under a European system of formula apportionment with a water’s edge limitation,
a decision by France to reduce the (apportionable) proﬁts of the French parent would
also reduce the tax base of other EU countries, assuming that the French multinational
operates on a European scale. Indeed, the main eﬀect on the tax base may well be felt
in the rest of Europe. If European governments wish to protect European multinationals
from double taxation when transfer prices vis a vis non-EU countries are adjusted, it
seems they will have to live with such ﬁscal externalities within Europe.
Moreover, when separate accounts and arm’s length pricing are maintained for trans-
actions with non-European countries, companies and tax administrators in the EU will
still have to master separate accounting with its intricate transfer pricing rules as well as
the new system of formula apportionment.
Choosing a formula
The eﬀect of FA on private incentives and on the interjurisdictional distribution of
tax revenue depends crucially on the formula for apportionment of the tax base. Under
the three-factor formula applied by many US states, the taxable proﬁti nE Uc o u n t r yi


















Π, αK + αW + αS =1 (1)
where Ki , Wi and Si are the ﬁrm’s assets, payroll and sales in country i, respectively, K,
W and S are the corresponding EU-wide aggregates, and Π is the total EU-wide proﬁtt o
be apportioned. The α-weights must sum to one, and under the famous ”Massachusetts
formula” they are all equal to 1/3. According to formula (1) the tax base allocated to a
jurisdiction reﬂects the ﬁrm’s business activity in that jurisdiction, as measured by the
(weighted average of the) proportions of the ﬁrm’s total assets, payroll and sales located
in the jurisdiction. As shown by McLure (1980), the application of a formula like (1)
means that local corporate income taxes are essentially turned into taxes on or subsidies
to the factors entering the formula. As a simpliﬁed example, suppose that only assets and
7payroll are included in the formula (αS =0 ) and that there are only two jurisdictions.
Let wi and Li denote the real wage rate and the ﬁrm’s labour input in jurisdiction i,
so that Wi/W is wiLi/(w1L1 + w2L2), i =1 ,2.I fr is the non-deductible international
cost of equity ﬁnance (assumed here to be the only source of ﬁnance), and if F (K1,L 1)
is the ﬁrm’s real revenue from production in jurisdiction 1, the ﬁrst-order conditions for























































where FK and FL are the marginal revenue products of capital and labour, respectively,
ti is the corporate tax rate in jurisdiction i,a n dt is the weighted average tax rate across
the two jurisdictions. Equation (2) shows that a high-tax (low-tax) country will have
a cost of capital (FK)a b o v e( b e l o w )t h ea v e r a g ei n t e r n a t i o n a lc o s to fe q u i t yﬁnance,
r/(1 − t), to the extent that assets enter the apportionment formula (αK > 0). Equation
(3) is more remarkable, showing that the corporation tax will distort the demand for
labour when payroll is included in the formula (αW > 0). In a high-tax (low-tax) country
the corporation tax will work in part like a local tax on (subsidy to) the use of labour,
because an increase in local employment will shift more of the worldwide corporate tax
bill towards the high-tax (low-tax) country. Assuming that the corporation tax is really
intended as a tax on the return to capital and not as an intransparent tax on/subsidy to
other factors, it therefore seems most appropriate to set αW = αS =0and αK =1 .
As a way of avoiding distortions to factor location under FA, one might use industry
weights rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc weights in the apportionment formula. For example, the
fractions Ki/K, Wi/W and Si/S in formula (1) could be the industry average for country
i rather than the speciﬁc ﬁgures for the individual taxpaying ﬁrm in a given industry.
Assuming that the individual ﬁrm is small relative to its industry, such an approach would
have two important advantages. First, companies would not be able to shift taxable
income towards low-tax jurisdictions by manipulating the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm e a s u r e so ft h e i r
8factor use. Second, and more fundamentally, the apportionment of taxable proﬁts would
no longer distort decisions on factor location. When the individual ﬁrm can no longer
inﬂuence the allocation of its tax base by changing the location of its factors, the last
terms on the right-hand sides of (2) and (3) disappear, and for all ﬁrms in a given industry
in the EU the weighted average corporate tax rate t becomes identical. Hence the required
marginal pre-tax return to capital would tend to be equalized across EU member states
for all ﬁrms in the industry. On the other hand, this method of apportionment would raise
the diﬃcult administrative problem of determining the industry to which each individual
ﬁrm belongs. In practice, many multinationals operate in several diﬀerent industries,
so for these companies tax administrators would have to allocate the EU-wide taxable
income across the diﬀerent sectors with diﬀerent apportionment formulas. One can easily
imagine the uncertainties and legal disputes which might be caused by such a system.
To avoid these problems, one might go further and use common macro weights for all
ﬁrms in all EU countries. For instance, exploiting the fact that the VAT bases are already
harmonized in the EU, the corporate tax base could be allocated across member states
in accordance with each country’s share of the aggregate EU VAT base. Even though
member states would retain the right to set their own corporate tax rates, this macro
approach to FA would imply that all multinationals in all industries would face the same
corporate tax rate throughout the EU. From the viewpoint of MNEs, the corporate tax
rate would be harmonized at the VAT-base weighted average of the tax rates in each
member state. Hence the required marginal pre-tax rates of return would be equalized
across the EU, thus ensuring EU-wide production eﬃciency. The system would put an
end to corporate tax competition in the EU.2 Indeed, a small member state with an
insigniﬁcant share of the aggregate EU VAT base would be able to raise its corporate tax
rate without having to fear a (noticeable) reduction of investment by European MNEs
in the country. Previous concerns over a ”race to the bottom” might therefore give way
to concerns over a ”race to the top” in corporate tax rates, since a rise in an individual
country’s corporate tax rate would have a negative spillover on all other member states by
raising the cost of capital throughout the EU. Another controversial implication is that
an FA system based on macro weights would break the link between the individual ﬁrm’s
activity in a member country and its tax payment to that country. Each member state
9would be entitled to tax a share of the proﬁts of all MNEs operating in Europe, even those
without any operations in the country. If taxpayers and policy makers do not appreciate
the system for what it is - essentially a harmonized European corporation tax with revenue
sharing among member states - this decoupling between tax payments and the location
of individual ﬁrm activities may well make the system politically unacceptable. Given
the current lack of enthusiasm for far-reaching harmonization, the discussion below will
therefore assume that a European system of formula apportionment will have to be based
on ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures of the location of the factors in the formula.
Measuring the factors in the formula
This raises the question how the factors are to be measured. The analysis above
showed that assets should be the only factor in the formula if the corporation tax is really
intended to be a tax on the return to capital. Since assets are already recorded in the
ﬁrm’s tax accounts, it seems natural to use this measure in the formula for apportioning
proﬁts. However, as pointed out by McLure and Weiner (2000, pp. 269-70), intangible
assets constitute an important part of the total assets of many multinationals, and it is
inherently diﬃcult to measure intangibles and to assign a situs to them. In principle, one
could calculate the value of a patented intangible asset by discounting the royalties paid
for its use. But intra-company royalties and the associated asset values in the formula
may be distorted as multinationals try to shift taxable proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax
jurisdictions. Thus, if intangibles are included, a system of FA based on asset values
will be subject to some of the same transfer pricing problems as the current system of
separate accounting. Moreover, intangibles do not always yield royalties which may be
used to calculate their value, and some intangibles may arise from the synergy eﬀects
generated by the interaction of all the aﬃliates in a corporate group, making it unclear
how the asset value should be allocated across aﬃliates. In reaction to these problems,
one might exclude intangibles from the asset base in the formula, but this procedure
could distort the choice between the development of tangible and intangible assets and
would probably impute an unduly low share of the tax base to corporate headquarters
where intangibles are often developed.
As a possible way out of these diﬃculties, one might use the ﬁrm’s VAT accounts
as the point of departure for measuring its use of capital in each jurisdiction. Starting
10from the current destination-based measure of value-added under the European VAT
systems, one would add back export sales and deduct imports to obtain value added
at origin. Then one would add capital investment and subtract depreciation allowances
as well as labour costs to arrive at that part of local value-added which accrues to the
capital invested in the jurisdiction. This would then serve as the basis for the allocation
of taxable proﬁts across jurisdictions. Although Hellerstein and McLure (2003) appear
to support such a solution, they also stress that apportionment based on (part of) value
added at origin will be vulnerable to transfer pricing, since multinationals may manipulate
the prices of intracompany sales to shift the value added within the company towards
low-tax jurisdictions. To be sure, multinationals would no longer be able to shift income
across jurisdictions through intracompany debt shifting, so in principle thin capitalization
rules would no longer be needed for companies subject to proﬁt allocation based on
VAT accounts. But for other intracompany transactions the problem of transfer pricing
regulation would essentially remain the same as under the current system of separate
accounting. Since the alleviation of transfer pricing problems is usually cited as the main
purpose of FA, it would seem paradoxical to reintroduce these problems via the method
for measuring the factor(s) in the formula.
In summary, if policy makers wish to maintain the corporation tax as a tax on capital,
the apportionment of proﬁts should be based on some measure of capital input, but then
the apportionment formula would perpetuate some of the current problems of transfer
pricing if intangible assets are included in the measure of capital, or if capital input
is measured by value added at origin minus labour costs. Thus the belief found in
the theoretical literature that FA solves the transfer pricing problem may be far too
optimistic.
2.4. Fiscal externalities under separate accounting and formula apportion-
ment
Assuming that an acceptable solution to the technical design problems of FA can be
found, a fundamental question is how a switch from separate accounting to formula ap-
portionment would change the character and strength of cross-border ﬁscal externalities?
How would such a reform change the impact of one country’s tax policy on economic
activity, public revenue and social welfare in other countries? For example, would a
11switch to formula apportionment intensify corporate tax competition in Europe, thereby
increasing the likelihood of a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates? The theoret-
ical analysis of Gordon and Wilson (1986) suggests that the answer is ”Yes!”. Their
model implies that the underprovision of public goods caused by interjurisdictional ﬁs-
cal competition will be more severe under formula apportionment than under separate
accounting. The intuition for their result is the following: assuming perfect competition
and free entry, the after-tax proﬁts of ﬁrms are driven to zero in long-run equilibrium. If
a country raises the marginal tax burden on capital invested in its jurisdiction, taxable
pre-tax proﬁts earned in the country will therefore have to rise by a similar amount in
the long run. Under separate accounting, all of this rise in pre-tax proﬁts will increase
the local tax base. By contrast, under formula apportionment part of the increase in
local pre-tax proﬁts will be allocated to other countries. For any given increase in the
local marginal tax burden, and hence for any given increase in the disincentive to local
investment, the rise in local tax revenue will thus be higher under separate accounting
than under formula apportionment. At the margin it is therefore more costly for local
governments to raise revenue under FA, and hence the underprovision of public goods is
more pronounced under this tax regime.
Sunley (2002) has suggested another reason why a switch to FA may intensify tax
competition. Under separate accounting countries compete to attract the marginal in-
vestment, which brings into the country’s tax base the marginal return to capital. Under
as y s t e mo fF Aw h e r ep r o ﬁts are apportioned according to the amount of capital invested
in each jurisdiction, the tax base allocated to country i is (Ki/K)Π,w h e r eKi is the cap-
ital invested in country i, K is the ﬁrm’s global capital stock, and Π is the global pre-tax
proﬁt. If country i succeeds in attracting a unit of investment from other countries (so
that Ki rises by one unit while K and Π stay constant), its tax base will increase by the
average return to capital Π/K, which is usually higher than the marginal return. Ac-
cording to Sunley, the incentive to attract capital from other jurisdictions may therefore
be stronger under formula apportionment than under separate accounting.
Plausible though they may sound, these arguments why FA would strengthen tax
competition may not hold under more general assumptions. The Gordon-Wilson result
mentioned above is driven by the assumption that ﬁrms are competitive, earning zero
12net proﬁts. However, multinational companies often possess market power enabling them
to make positive economic proﬁts even in the long run. Moreover, the model set up by
Gordon and Wilson does not allow for income shifting via transfer-pricing. Since the
possibilities for income shifting are weaker (in theory non-existent) under formula ap-
portionment than under separate accounting, a switch to FA will weaken the incentives
for governments to set a low corporate tax rate in order to attract ”paper proﬁts”. Fur-
thermore, the argument by Sunley explained above seems to be too partial: in order
to relocate investment towards its jurisdiction, a government will have to lower its tax
rate, and under FA the eﬀects of a unit reduction in the local tax rate on local tax rev-
enue and local investment will be diﬀerent from the corresponding eﬀects under separate
accounting.
Against this background, the appendix to this paper sets up a formal model to study
the cross-border spillover eﬀects of corporate tax policies under separate accounting and
formula apportionment. The model is inspired by the one developed by Nielsen et al.
(2001), but it imposes more structure on production technologies, thereby generating
sharper results. I consider two countries embedded in a world economy with a given
international cost of equity ﬁnance. Each country is the host of a multinational parent
company with a foreign subsidiary in the other country. For each unit of capital invested
in the foreign subsidiary, the parent company must deliver a certain amount of an es-
sential input, say, a patented technology or a headquarter service needed to operate the
subsidiary’s capital stock. Via its choice of the transfer price of this input, the MNE may
shift income between the parent and the subsidiary. Because it is costly to justify dis-
torted transfer prices vis á vis the tax authorities, and since distorted intracompany price
signals may generate internal organizational ineﬃciencies, the parent company incurs a
cost which rises with the deviation between the transfer price and the true resource cost
of the input delivered to the subsidiary. Under separate accounting, each MNE balances
the costs of distorted transfer prices against the gain from shifting income towards the
lower-taxed entity in the multinational group.
Within this setting the appendix analyzes how an increase in one country’s corporate
tax rate aﬀects economic activity, tax revenue and social welfare in the other country.
Consider ﬁrst the spillover eﬀects on foreign economic activity, assuming that the corpo-
13ration tax is levied on a source basis, with the ”source” of income determined by separate
accounting (SA). If country 1 has a higher corporate tax rate than country 2, a further
rise in country 1’s tax rate will increase outward foreign direct investment from country
1 into country 2. To understand why, recall that additional investment abroad increases
the scope for income shifting between the parent and the subsidiary by increasing the
volume of intracompany transactions. Thus, as the tax rate on the parent company in
country 1 rises further above the tax rate on the subsidiary in country 2, it becomes
proﬁtable to increase investment in the foreign subsidiary to allow more income shifting
towards country 2. But suppose instead that country 1’s tax rate is initially below that
of country 2. In that case a rise country 1’s tax rate will reduce that country’s outward
FDI into country 2, because the smaller tax rate diﬀerential between the two countries
reduces the value of foreign investment as a vehicle for income shifting. The point is that
a further rise in the tax rate of a high-tax country will tend to increase the international
dispersion of tax rates, thereby increasing the attractiveness of cross-border investment
as a means of exploiting tax rate diﬀerentials through income shifting. By contrast, a
rise in the corporate tax rate of a low-tax country will tend to reduce the international
dispersion of tax rates, thus reducing the incentive to invest abroad in order to take
advantage of tax rate diﬀerentials. Under SA the eﬀect on outward FDI of a rise in a
country’s corporate tax rate therefore depends on the initial tax position of that country.
In the benchmark case where initial tax rates are identical across countries, the eﬀect
of a rise in one country’s tax rate rate on the incentive for outward FDI will only be
of second-order magnitude. To a ﬁrst-order approximation, a marginal increase in one
country’s corporate tax rate will then have no eﬀect on outward FDI.
Because of the uncertain eﬀect on outward FDI, and hence on foreign economic ac-
tivity, the spillover eﬀect of a rise in one country’s tax rate on the other country’s tax
revenue is generally ambiguous under SA. However, if initial tax rates are identical, we
noted that there are no (ﬁrst-order) spillover eﬀects on outward FDI, but an increase
in country 1’s tax rate will still induce MNEs in both countries to shift taxable income
towards country 2, generating an increase in that country’s tax revenue. By continuity,
if initial tax rates are not too dispersed, we may thus expect a positive international
spillover eﬀect on public revenue under separate accounting.
14If policy makers are only interested in public revenues, we would then expect that
corporate tax rates will be too low under SA, because each individual country neglects
the fact that a rise in its own corporate tax rate will increase the tax revenue of other
countries. But if policy makers are benevolent, they will seek to maximize social welfare
rather than just tax revenues. In the model set up in the appendix, it is natural to deﬁne
a country’s social welfare as the after-tax income of its residents plus its tax revenue,
appropriately adjusted for any deviation of the marginal cost of public funds from unity
(see equation (A.30) in the appendix). With this social welfare function, the international
spillover eﬀect of a rise in a country’s corporate tax rate is ambiguous under separate
accounting, because the positive eﬀect on foreign tax revenues will be oﬀset by a tax
exporting eﬀect, as the higher domestic tax rate reduces the after-tax return to foreign-
owned capital invested in the domestic economy.
Under formula apportionment, the cross-border spillover eﬀects of corporate tax pol-
icy are somewhat diﬀerent. According to the model in the appendix, a switch to FA will
eliminate the scope for income shifting through transfer-pricing, so there are no spillover
eﬀects via this channel (although the provisos mentioned in the previous section should
be kept in mind). The eﬀect of a rise in one country’s tax rate on the level of investment
in other countries are generally quite complex, as suggested by equation (2) above. How-
ever, if the initial corporate tax rates are identical across countries, the appendix shows
that a higher domestic tax rate will reduce investment in the foreign country under FA,
because the rise in the domestic tax rate drives up the weighted average tax rate im-
posed on global proﬁts, which include proﬁts earned abroad. The appendix also shows
that foreign tax revenue will be aﬀected through two channels. First, because it reduces
investment in both countries, the higher domestic tax reduces the taxable global proﬁts
of multinationals. Second, the rise in the domestic tax rate may aﬀect the fraction of the
global proﬁts tax base which is allocated to the foreign country. Assuming that proﬁts
are apportioned according to the amount of capital invested in each country, this eﬀect on
the foreign tax base will be positive if the domestic capital stock has a higher numerical
elastiticity with respect to the domestic tax rate than the foreign capital stock. If this
condition is met, the fraction of the global capital stock invested in the foreign country
will go up. While one might expect that the domestic capital stock is more elastic with
15respect to the domestic tax rate than the capital stock invested abroad, the appendix
shows that this is not necessarily the case under formula apportionment. In the bench-
mark case where the two elasticities are identical, there is no eﬀect on the international
allocation of the proﬁts tax base, and a rise in the domestic tax rate will then surely
reduce the foreign tax base, due to the fall in global proﬁts stemming from lower global
investment.
Thus the spillover eﬀect on foreign tax revenue may well be negative under FA. The
spillover eﬀect on foreign social welfare would then also be negative, since the higher
domestic tax rate reduces the after-tax proﬁt incomes of all investors, including foreign-
ers. With a negative cross-border spillover eﬀect on social welfare, corporate tax rates
w o u l dt e n dt ob eineﬃciently high under formula apportionment in a non-cooperative
equilibrium where national policy makers neglect the international spillovers.
In summary, the analysis in the appendix indicates that whereas domestic corporate
tax policy will tend to have oﬀsetting eﬀects on foreign private income and foreign tax
revenue under separate accounting, it is quite possible that a rise in the domestic tax
rate will have a negative impact on both of these foreign variables under formula appor-
tionment. Rather than intensifying a race to the bottom in corporate tax rates, a switch
from separate accounting to formula apportionment may thus lead to inoptimally high
tax rates in the absence of international tax coordination.3
3. ALTERNATIVE ROADS TO EUROPEAN COMPANY TAX REFORM
3.1. The Commission’s blueprints: some critical comments
The sections above have discussed some aspects of formula apportionment which are
common to all of the Commission’s diﬀerent blueprints for a consolidated corporate tax
base summarized in section 2.1. I will now oﬀer some comments on the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so f
the various proposed designs for a single tax base for European multinational enterprises.4
The system of Home State Taxation (HST) implies that EU multinationals are allowed
to calculate the consolidated proﬁts on their EU-wide activities according to the tax code
of the residence country of the parent company. From the perspective of national policy
makers eager to maintain autonomy in matters of tax policy, the main advantage of HST
is that it does not require any harmonization. All that is needed is that member states
mutually recognize the company tax systems of the other countries participating in the
16system. From the perspective of the business community, one attractive feature of HST
is that it is optional: no company will be forced to switch to the system, but those that
make the switch are likely to experience lower tax compliance costs, since they will no
longer have to adhere to the diﬀerent and sometimes conﬂicting national rules for the
setting of transfer prices. Switching to a consolidated tax base will also enable companies
to oﬀset losses on operations in one member state against proﬁts made in another member
state, and corporate restructuring within a consolidated group will meet with fewer tax
obstacles.
At the same time the attractive ﬂexibility of HST is also the main weakness of the
system, since the existing diﬀerences across national tax systems will continue to create
distortions, as emphasized by Mintz and Weiner (2001). Apart from the fact that national
diﬀerences in statutory tax rates will remain, members of diﬀerent multinational groups
operating in any given EU country will be subject to diﬀerent tax base rules if their parent
companies are headquartered in diﬀerent member states, thus violating capital import
neutrality. Indeed, the analysis in the Commission report indicates that the introduction
of HST would increase the dispersion of eﬀective corporate tax rates across the EU.
In auditing the foreign aﬃliates of the domestic parent company, the tax authorities
of the Home State will also depend on the assistance of the foreign tax administrators
who may not be familiar with the Home State tax code. Moreover, HST would invite
member states to compete by oﬀering generous tax base rules in order to attract corporate
headquarters. Such competition would generate negative revenue spillovers, since a more
narrow tax base deﬁnition in any member state would apply not only to income from
activity in the Home State, but to income earned throughout the EU area. Any laxity
in the auditing and enforcement eﬀort of the Home State tax administration would also
have a negative external eﬀect by reduing the revenues accruing to other member states.
Finally, the fact that companies may freely choose between HST and the existing tax
regime is bound to create some revenue loss as ﬁrms opt for the system promising the
lowest tax bill.
In contrast to Home State Taxation, the Consolidated Common Tax Base (CCTB)
relies on a harmonized set of rules deﬁning the tax base for those companies opting for
consolidation of their EU-wide proﬁts. This will eliminate tax base competition for cor-
17porate headquarters. CCTB will also create a higher degree of capital import neutrality
than HST where multinationals operating in the same member state will be subject to 15
diﬀerent Home State tax regimes (assuming that all EU countries participate in the sys-
tem). Of course, the price to be paid for these advantages of CCTB is the loss of national
autonomy implied by tax base harmonization. Moreover, the fact that the harmonized
tax base would apply only to multinationals could create distortions between large and
small ﬁr m sw i t h i ne a c hm e m b e rs t a t e ,s i n c es m a l lﬁrms without international operations
would still be subject to the domestic tax rules. The co-existence of two diﬀerent tax
regimes could also create opportunities for tax arbitrage and generate artiﬁcial incentives
for investment abroad. To illustrate, suppose the domestic tax base rules of Member
State 1 allow less generous deductions than the CCTB tax base deﬁnition. A company
in Member State 1 without any foreign operations might then ﬁnd it proﬁtable to start
up a branch or subsidiary in another member state, since this would enable the company
to switch to the more liberal CCTB rules for taxation of its pre-existing domestic activi-
ties. Obviously such behaviour would imply real investment distortions as well as public
revenue losses.
In addition to these distortions implied by CCTB, it would be a clear disadvantage
that each national tax administration would have to deal with two diﬀerent tax systems,
that is, the new Consolidated Common Tax Base applying to multinationals, and the
existing national tax rules for domestic ﬁrms. Since the main responsibility for the
auditing of a multinational group would presumably rest with the tax administration of
the home state, CCTB would also have the same weakness as HST that laxity in tax
enforcement would generate negative revenue spillovers on other member states.
The European Union Company Tax (EUCT) would eliminate the incentive problem
caused by the fact that, under HST and CCTB, national governments would only receive
af r a c t i o no ft h er e v e n u eg a i nf r o mm o r ee ﬀective enforcement of tax rules. Under the
EUCT the (optional) tax system for European multinationals would be administered at
the EU level, and the revenue would accrue to the EU budget. Apart from this ”federal”
aspect of the EUCT - which makes it highly controversial in member states opposed to
the idea of Europe as a federation - the EUCT would have the same features, and hence
t h es a m ew e a k n e s s e s ,a st h eC C T B .
18The fourth alternative considered in the Commission report is the Compulsory Har-
monized Tax Base (CHTB). Under this system a single corporate tax base applies to
all ﬁrms - domestic as well as international - in all member states. This will level the
playing ﬁeld between domestic and multinational ﬁrms and eliminate the need for na-
tional tax administrations to deal with two diﬀerent tax systems. Clearly the CHTB
will also eliminate tax base competition, and since the system is compulsory, ﬁrms will
have no possibility to minimize their tax bills by switching between diﬀerent optional tax
regimes. On the other hand, because it also harmonizes the tax rules for small domestic
ﬁrms, the CHTB involves a greater loss of national tax autonomy. Furthermore, given
the current diﬀerences in statutory corporate tax rates, a harmonization of the corporate
tax base might well lead to larger cross-country variations in eﬀective tax rates, since a
relatively high statutory tax rate is often compensated by relatively generous deductions
from taxable proﬁts.
3.2. European reactions to the Commission proposals5
Despite the problems mentioned in the previous section, important European interest
groups have taken a fairly positive attitude towards the Commission’s proposal to move
towards a consolidated corporate tax base for EU multinationals. In particular, the Union
of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE) supports a common
consolidated tax base with formula apportionment as the ultimate goal of EU company
tax policy, provided that the system is optional for companies, and provided that member
states can still freely compete against each other in the setting of corporate tax rates.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the business community supports a tax policy which
enables companies to opt for the most favourable tax regime without restraining tax
competition. Nor is it any surprise that member state tax administrators have expressed
strong reservations against a system which would allow companies to choose between a
consolidated tax base and the existing tax regime. They point out that such optionality
will generate revenue losses and that administering two diﬀerent tax systems at the same
time is an added burden.
The reactions of European tax experts to the Commission report have been somewhat
mixed. On the one hand most observers recognize that as the European economies become
ever more integrated, the case for formula apportionment as a potential solution to the
19transfer pricing problem is becoming stronger, even though FA may generate new types of
distortion. On the other hand many tax experts ﬁnd it paradoxical that the Commission
emphatically rejects any form of coordination of corporate tax rates, despite the ﬁnding
in the report that about three fourths of the current dispersion of eﬀective corporate tax
rates in the EU are due to diﬀerences in statutory tax rates. If the policy goal is to
reduce the tax distortions to the pattern of cross-border investment in Europe, it would
therefore seem necessary to bring statutory corporate tax rates more into line.
3.3. Is there a case for competition in tax rates?
Historically, the European Commission has in fact tended to favour a harmonization
or at least a gradual approximation of corporate tax rates as well as tax bases in Europe.
An approximation of rates and bases was also the approach recommended by the Ruding
Committee (1992). The Commission’s newly acquired hostility to tax rate coordination
reﬂects a recent shift in the dominant European view of tax competition. Only a few
years ago, the European Commission (1997) expressed concern that international tax
competition is shifting the tax burden from mobile capital onto unemployment-ridden
labour. However, more recently the Commission has expressed the view that ”..a reason-
able degree of tax competition within the EU is healthy and should be allowed to operate.
Tax competition may strengthen ﬁscal discipline to the extent that it encourages Member
States to streamline their public expenditure, thus allowing a reduction in the overall tax
burden.” (European Commission, 2001c, p. 4).
Whether tax competition is good or bad is a major issue which will continue to be
the subject of intense research and controversy.6 If one believes (as the Commission now
seems to do) that there is an inherent tendency for the public sector to overexpand,
because of pressures from special interest groups, and because the interests of politicians
and bureaucrats tend to be promoted through larger public budgets, one may see tax
competition as the taxpayer’s safeguard against exploitation from a revenue-maximizing
Leviathan government. By contrast, if one sees the level and structure of the public
budget as the outcome of a well-functioning democratic process reﬂecting the preferences
of (the majority of) the citizens, one will tend to see tax competition as a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy involving the futile and disruptive attempts of governments to encroach
upon each others’ mobile tax bases.
20Because it involves two fundamentally diﬀerent views of government, the controversy
on the vices and virtues of tax competition can easily degenerate into an unproductive
exchange of political articles of faith. Edwards and Keen (1996) made a constructive
attempt to impose more intellectual discipline on participants in this debate. To allow
for both of the contrasting views of tax competition, they assumed that some fraction
of marginal public spending is wasted on rent-seeking activities, whereas the remaining
part generates welfare for the representative citizen. Using an otherwise standard model
of capital tax competition, they then showed that international tax competition increases
consumer welfare if the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate is lower
than the fraction of marginal public spending which is wasted. This analytical approach
seems useful since it forces participants in the tax competition debate to be more speciﬁc
about their assumptions: how large do they consider the tax base elasticity to be? How
large is the fraction of marginal public spending which they consider to be pure waste?
The Edwards-Keen model of tax competition has an interesting long-run implication:
as international economic integration proceeds, the elasticity of the tax base will go up,
thereby increasing the likelihood that tax competition is harmful, unless political rent-
seeking is also systematically increasing with the degree of economic integration. From
this perspective it is far from obvious why the European Commission should suddenly
adopt a more favourable view of tax competition in a era of increasing tax base mobility.
Given the various imperfections in the political process, it would be naive to deny
that public funds are sometimes used ineﬃciently. Yet the question remains whether
unfettered tax competition is the appropriate answer to this problem. Tax competition
may certainly lead to cuts in public spending, but won’t these spending cuts take place
in areas where political resistance and lobbying eﬀort is the weakest, rather than in those
areas where the public sector is most ineﬃcient? And how do we know that tax competi-
tion will discipline public spending rather than amplify the well-known ”deﬁcit-bias” in
political decision-making?7 If rent seeking and public sector ineﬃciency is the problem,
the natural policy response is to reform the political and public sector institutions which
give disproportionate power to special interest groups. Tax competition seems a very
indirect and poorly targeted instrument for countering rent seeking.
As suggested by these remarks, I believe that the normative case for tax competition
21as an appropriate institutional response to public sector ineﬃciency is rather weak. The
previous sections have identiﬁed a number of problems with the Commission proposals
for a consolidated tax base with formula apportionment. If the alleged beneﬁts of tax
competition do not provide a convincing argument against corporate tax harmonization,
it is relevant to ask whether harmonization could be a preferable alternative to the type
of company tax reform proposed in the recent Commission report? To avoid misun-
derstandings, let me stress that formula apportionment deserves serious scrutiny as a
potential policy response to the problems of transfer pricing, given that corporate tax
rate diﬀerentials will surely persist for many years to come. However, since these diﬀer-
entials create a number of obvious problems under FA as well as under SA, it is still a
legitimate question for a normative analysis whether corporate tax harmonization should
remain a long run goal for the European Union. Under the current unanimity principle
for tax policy making in the EU, harmonization across all member states is undoubtedly
politically infeasible, but under the new institution of Enhanced Cooperation enshrined
in the Nice Treaty, a subgroup of member states could proceed with tax harmonization
if they ﬁnd such a policy desirable.
3.4. Harmonization after all?
A harmonization of corporate tax rates and tax bases could achieve the basic goals
set up in the Commission report. First, the harmonization of tax bases would ensure
that European companies would only have to deal with one corporate tax system, thus
reducing compliance costs. By also allowing cross-border loss oﬀsets, as already prac-
ticed by Denmark, the EU would then come close to the common consolidated tax base
advocated by the Commission. Second, the harmonization of statutory corporate tax
rates would eliminate the tax incentives for transfer pricing, reducing the need for com-
plex transfer pricing regulation.8 In addition, the harmonization of rates as well as bases
would improve the allocation of capital across Europe, as elaborated in the next section.
In the current area of euro-scepticism it may seem quite radical and utterly unrealistic
to propose a harmonization of the rate as well as the base of the corporation tax. However,
the distribution of the tax burden across taxpayers depends on the total tax burden on
income from capital. Apart from the corporation tax, this burden also includes personal
taxes on income and wealth. An eﬀective exchange of information among national tax
22administrations - as intended by the so-called Savings Directive recently adopted by EU
member states - will improve the ability of member countries to enforce personal taxes
on the interest and dividends paid out by the corporate sector, as well as personal taxes
on capital gains on shares. If information exchange provides member states with more
room for manoeuvre in the ﬁeld of personal income taxation, they may be more willing
to give up autonomy in the area of corporate taxation to eliminate the many distortions
to the Single Market created by the current corporate tax diﬀerentials.
The point is the classical one that the corporation tax is just a withholding tax, serving
as a prepayment of the ﬁnal taxes on the capital income originating in the corporate
sector. The ﬁnal tax burden is determined by the personal taxes levied on interest,
dividends and capital gains, and these taxes will remain under the control of member state
governments even if the corporation tax were harmonized. If a member state ﬁnds that
the harmonized corporation tax implies an inappropriately low level of tax on corporate-
source equity income, it can rectify the situation by adding personal taxes on dividends
and capital gains at the shareholder level. If it ﬁnds that the harmonized corporation
tax is too high, it can use part of its corporate tax revenue to ﬁnance tax credits to
shareholders.
It might be argued that if the corporation tax is really just a backstop serving as pre-
payment of the shareholder’s personal income tax, national corporate tax rates should be
allowed to vary in accordance with the variations in national personal tax rates. However,
in practice EU member states do not seem to prefer a tight link between corporate and
personal tax rates, as illustrated in Figure 1. Using data for 2001, the ﬁgure plots the
statutory corporate income tax rates against the top marginal personal income tax rates
in the EU-19, deﬁned as the 15 current member states plus the four largest countries
in the group of new Eastern European member states soon to be added to the Union.
The slope of the estimated OLS regression line in Figure 1 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and the variation in personal tax rates explains almost none of the variation
in corporate tax rates. This suggests that member countries could easily live with some
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Figure 1. Corporate and personal income tax rates in the EU-19.
Note: Corporate tax rates per 1st of January 2001; personal tax rates for 2001. The data set consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic in addition to the existing 15 EU member states.
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Figure 2. Corporate income tax rates and real GDP in the EU-19.
Note: Corporate tax rates per 1st of January 2001. Purchasing power corrected GDP from the year 2000. The data set consists of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic in addition to the existing 15 EU member states.
Source: KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey and Penn World Table 6.1.
24Another economic argument against corporate tax harmonization is provided by the
theoretical analysis of Baldwin and Krugman (2002) who set up a model of tax compe-
tition with agglomeration forces. With agglomeration forces operating, industry is not
indiﬀerent to location, and mobile capital becomes a quasi-ﬁxed factor. Under tax com-
petition advanced ”core” nations with strong agglomeration forces set their corporate tax
rates at a level which is above the tax rates chosen by less advanced ”periphery” coun-
tries, but just suﬃciently low to prevent a migration of industry towards the periphery.
In this setting Baldwin and Krugman show that tax harmonization will always hurt at
least one country, whereas a minimum tax rate set at the lowest equilibrium tax rate
w o u l dl e a dt oaw e a kP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t .
What is the empirical relevance of this analysis? Finding reliable proxies for agglom-
eration forces is very diﬃcult, but one would expect that the external agglomeration
beneﬁts in a country are positively related to the absolute size of its GDP, since ab-
solute GDP reﬂects the size of the local market as well as the local level of technology
and productivity. Figure 2 plots corporate tax rates in the EU-19 against the absolute
PPP-adjusted levels of real GDP in the various countries. Again the estimated slope
of the regression line is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Although absolute GDP is
an imperfect indicator of agglomeration beneﬁts, Figure 2 does not support the view
that agglomeration forces induce EU countries to choose very diﬀerent corporate tax
rates. However, in a multiple regression analysis including several explanatory variables,
Krogstrup (2002, ch.2) did ﬁnd some evidence of agglomeration eﬀects on eﬀective cor-
porate tax rates. Thus there may be an economic geography case for allowing peripheral
member states to choose a lower level of taxation in the early stage of their catching-up
process. Under a harmonized EU corporation tax, this could be done by allowing periph-
eral countries meeting certain objective criteria to grant special investment tax credits
for a limited time period, subject to approval by the European Commission.
3.5. How big are the gains from harmonization?
From a normative pan-European standpoint, the case for corporate tax harmoniza-
tion should be evaluated in the light of two basic principles of the European Union.
One guideline is the goal of an undistorted common market with a level playing ﬁeld for
25business competition. This goal of economic eﬃciency is well served by corporate tax
harmonization. The other basic principle is subsidiarity, requiring as little centralized
decision-making as possible. Clearly the subsidiarity principle works against tax harmo-
nization. Trading oﬀ the eﬃciency gain from corporate tax harmonization against the
resulting loss of national autonomy is a matter for politicians, but the economic analyst
may help them to make informed decisions by oﬀering estimates of the likely magnitude
of the eﬃciency gains from harmonization. Armed with such estimates, policy makers
are in a better position to decide whether the allocational gains from harmonization are
suﬃciently large to justify the loss of national sovereignty.
In Sørensen (2002b, 2002c) I have developed an applied general equilibrium model
designed to quantify the eﬀects of various forms of international tax competition and
tax coordination. The current version of the model - called the OECDTAX model - is
c a l i b r a t e dt oad a t as e tf o r2 4O E C Dc o u n t r i e s ,i n c l u d i n gt h e1 5c u r r e n tE Um e m b e r
states. The model is static, depicting a long run equilibrium. It allows for a considerable
amount of institutional detail by distinguishing between foreign direct investment and
foreign portfolio investment; between household investors and institutional investors; be-
tween diﬀerent asset types like stocks, bonds, and real estate; between debt and equity,
etc. The model also includes international proﬁt-shifting via transfer-pricing by multi-
national corporations (assuming separate accounting), and it allows for domestic and
international tax evasion by assuming that only a fraction of the capital income of port-
folio investors can be monitored and taxed. Wages and working hours are assumed to be
set by trade unions whose market power generates involuntary unemployment. Labour
is immobile across countries and capital is imperfectly mobile. The international supply
of capital to any country is thus an increasing function of the net rate of return oﬀered
in that country. By varying the elasticity of substitution between assets invested in dif-
ferent countries, one can vary the degree of capital mobility and approximate a situation
of perfect mobility. In particular, the model is designed to allow for a higher degree of
capital mobility within the EU than between the EU and the rest of the world.
The OECDTAX model and its calibration is described in more detail in Sørensen
(2001c, 2002b). In Table 1 I have used the model to simulate the long run eﬀects of a
complete harmonization of the statutory corporate tax rate as well as the corporate tax
26base in the EU, starting from the tax rules prevailing in 2000. The broadness of the
corporate tax base in the model is determined by the rate of capital allowance. In the
initial equilibrium this parameter has been calibrated to generate a realistic corporate
tax revenue relative to GDP, given the statutory corporate tax rate. Harmonization is
assumed to take place around the unweighted average corporate tax rate of 33.7 percent
and around the unweighted average rate of depreciation for tax purposes. I consider
harmonization around unweighted rather than weighted averages because the unanimity
rule for tax policy decisions in the EU implicitly gives equal weight to large and small
countries. On the other hand, the EU averages reported in columns 3 through 8 in Table
1 are population-weighted averages, to allow a utilitarian social welfare interpretation of
the welfare eﬀects for the EU as a whole, in line with the utilitarian social welfare ﬁgures
for the individual member states given in columns 5 and 8. The ﬁrst two columns in
Table 1 show the changes in each country’s tax parameters implied by harmonization. If
the ﬁgures in both of these columns have a negative (positive) sign, the country combines
a relatively high (low) statutory tax rate with a relatively narrow (broad) tax base in
the initial equilibrium. For these countries the change in the corporate tax rate and the
change in the tax base will have oﬀsetting eﬀects on domestic investment and output.
For countries where the numbers in columns 1 and 2 have opposite signs, the changes in
the rate and in the base work in the same direction.
The simulation summarized in columns 3 through 5 assumes that the change in tax
revenue is oﬀset by a corresponding change in lump sum transfers to households to keep
the government budget balanced. The table records the changes in real GDP, public
revenue, and consumer welfare.10 The simulation reported in columns 6 through 8 assumes
instead that government budget balance is maintained through adjustment in the tax rate
on labour income. Since the labour income tax rate aﬀects structural unemployment via
its impact on union wage setting, the resulting changes in the unemployment rate are
also indicated. The economic eﬀects on countries outside the EU are not shown in the
table, since they are generally quite small.
Because of uncertainty regarding many of the model parameters, the results in Table













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































281) While most member states will gain from corporate tax harmonization, some coun-
tries will actually lose. However, there is an aggregate welfare gain for the EU as a whole,
since harmonization of the source-based corporation tax reduces cross-country diﬀerences
in required pre-tax rates of return, leading to a more eﬃcient allocation of capital across
Europe. In principle, it should thus be possible for the winners to compensate the losing
countries, say, through transfers via the EU budget.
2) The overall welfare gain from corporate tax harmonization seems to be quite small.
The recorded gain is of the same order of magnitude as the estimated savings on trans-
action costs due to the introduction of the euro. The small size of the gain reﬂects
several factors. First, a considerable part of the total capital stock is invested outside the
corporate sector. In particular, housing capital accounts for a large fraction of the aggre-
gate capital stock in the model. Second, corporate tax harmonization is not suﬃcient to
equalize the cost of corporate capital across the EU, since capital costs are also aﬀected
by the non-harmonized tax rules for household and institutional investors. In particular,
because of ineﬀective enforcement of taxes on foreign source income, the existing personal
capital income taxes tend to work like another layer of source-based taxation on top of
the corporate income tax, interfering with production eﬃciency. Third, assets are not
perfectly substitutable across EU countries, as indicated by the observed home bias in
investor portfolios, and corporations earn location-speciﬁc rents. The imperfect mobility
of capital and the fact that the corporation tax is partly a tax on pure rents tend to limit
the distortionary eﬀects of existing corporate tax diﬀerentials.
3) The changes in GDP are typically much larger than the changes in consumer
welfare, and not always of the same sign. In part this reﬂects that an increase in GDP
requires an increase in factor inputs which is costly in terms of welfare, but it also reﬂects
that capital mobility breaks the link between national income and domestic product, i.e.,
part of the changes in GDP are achieved through capital imports or capital exports.
4) The eﬀects of corporate tax harmonization will diﬀer, sometimes by non-trivial
amounts, depending on the ﬁscal instrument used to balance the public budget. It may
seem surprising that unemployment and GDP generally change in the same direction
when the budget is balanced via adjustment of the labour income tax rate. The reason is
29that countries which are forced to raise their eﬀective corporate tax rate will experience
a fall in output as a result of lower domestic investment, but at the same time they will
gain corporate tax revenue. This allows a cut in the distortionary tax on labour which
in turn reduces structural unemployment, although not enough to reverse the fall in
GDP. Through analogous mechanisms, countries which are forced to reduce their eﬀective
corporate tax rate will tend to experience a simultaneous rise in GDP and unemployment.
Perhaps the most important implication of the OECDTAX model is the small mag-
nitude of the aggregate gain from corporate tax harmonization. Taken at face value, the
simulation results strongly suggest that the static eﬃciency gains from harmonization
do not justify the loss of national tax autonomy, especially if the international transfers
needed to compensate the losing countries generate deadweight losses. However, it should
be recalled that the switch to a single EU corporate tax system could imply a signiﬁcant
drop in the costs of tax compliance and tax administration. This beneﬁt is not captured
by the OECDTAX model.
Nor does the model capture the social welfare gain which will arise if corporate tax
harmonization enables governments with egalitarian preferences to implement more redis-
tributive policies than would be possible under unfettered tax competition. To highlight
this gain, I have developed an alternative simulation model with endogenous policy mak-
ing where tax competition forces a reduction in redistributive transfers (see Sørensen,
2000, 2001a). The government’s aversion to inequality is calibrated to ensure that the
initial model equilibrium reproduces the level of redistributive transfers observed in the
data. On this basis I ﬁnd that tax harmonization in the EU would raise social welfare
by about 0.1-0.4 percent of GDP, depending on the assumed degree of capital mobility
between the EU and the rest of the world. This is not an eﬃciency gain, but rather
a social welfare gain from a more equitable income distribution. Thus, if one acknowl-
edges that the existing tax-transfer systems reﬂect a social preference for equity, the gain
from EU corporate tax harmonization could well be more than twice as large as the pure
eﬃciency gain reported in Table 1.11 Still, the estimated gain remains relatively small,
because the mobility of capital between the EU and the rest of the world limits the scope
for redistributive capital taxes in Europe.
304. CONCLUDING REMARKS
With its recent endorsement of formula apportionment of a consolidated corporate tax
base, and its simultaneous rejection of restraints on competition in corporate tax rates,
the European Commission has abandoned historical positions and adopted a new and
radically diﬀerent approach to company taxation in Europe. This paper has criticized
several aspects of the Commission’s blueprints, such as the possibility for ﬁrms to opt for
the most liberal tax regime; the need to administer several diﬀerent tax systems at the
same time, and the distortions caused by the preservation of large tax rate diﬀerentials.
But in fairness to the Commission, one should acknowledge that the current political
mood in the EU is hostile to far-reaching tax coordination, let alone harmonization, and
the unanimity rule for tax policy decisions is a serious obstacle to progress in this area.
To make some headway, the Commission apparently hopes that its new rather business-
friendly approach to corporate taxation will induce the inﬂuential European business
community to lobby for more coordination. Yet the analysis in this paper suggests that
those features of the Commission blueprints which make them most attractive to business
are also likely to create new distortions. Hence it is not obvious that blueprints based on
optionality will signiﬁcantly improve the workings of the EU single market.
Nevertheless, with growing economic integration, a consolidated corporate tax base
with formula apportionment is an interesting reform option which deserves serious at-
tention. This paper attempted to contribute to the understanding of the ﬁscal spillover
eﬀects likely to emanate from such a tax system. One implication of the model developed
in the appendix is that formula apportionment may well lead to ineﬃciently high rates
of corporate income tax, contrary to claims made by previous writers.
The paper went on to argue that traditional corporate tax harmonization may still be
a legitimate long term goal for the European Union if it is combined with more eﬀective
enforcement of the residence principle in personal capital income taxation, allowing mem-
ber states to choose their own preferred overall level of capital taxation, and reducing
the interference of personal taxes with production eﬃciency. With corporate tax rate
harmonization, the diﬃculties associated with separate accounting as well as formula ap-
portionment would become much more manageable. However, the simulation exercises
in this paper suggest that the aggregate static eﬃciency gain from corporate tax harmo-
31nization would be quite small, because much of the capital stock is invested outside the
corporate sector, because the corporation tax is not the only element of the tax system
inﬂuencing the cost of corporate capital, and because capital mobility between Europe
and the rest of the world limits the scope for intra-European coordination. The case
for corporate tax harmonization would therefore have to rest mainly on the reduction
in the costs of tax compliance and tax administration emphasized in the recent Com-
mission report, and perhaps also on the improved ability of governments to maintain a
redistributive welfare state.
Most likely, economic integration will have to proceed much further before European
politicians decide that the gains from harmonization are worth the cost of giving up the
corporation tax as an instrument of national industrial policy.
32APPENDIX
Fiscal externalities under
separate accounting and formula apportionment
This appendix describes the model underlying the discussion of ﬁscal externalities in
section 2.4 of the main text. We consider a setting with two countries 1 and 2 facing a
given international cost of equity ﬁnance r determined in the world capital market. Each
country is the headquarter of a multinational enterprise producing in both countries.
Variables in upper-case letters refer to the multinational headquartered in country 1
(MNE1), while variables in lower-case letter relate to the multinational with headquarter
in country 2 (MNE2).
For MNE1, the real revenue from production in country 1 is given by F (K1),w h e r eK1
is the capital invested in the parent company in country 1, and F   > 0, F    < 0.F o re a c h
unit of capital K2 invested in the subsidiary in country 2, the parent company in MNE1
delivers S units of an essential service (say, a trademark or a patented technology) to the
subsidiary. Using the combined input SK2,w h e r eS is exogenous, the foreign subsidiary
generates real revenue   F (SK2),   F   > 0,   F    < 0. The parent’s resource cost of providing
a unit of service is equal to 1, but for tax reasons it may charge the subsidiary a transfer
price P which diﬀers from the true resource cost. Because it is costly to defend distorted
transfer prices vis á vis the tax authorities, and since distorted intra-company price signals
m a yg e n e r a t ei n t e r n a lo r g a n i z a t i o n a li n e ﬃciencies, the parent incurs real costs of transfer
pricing given by the convex function C(P) with properties
C (1) = C
  (1) = 0,C
 (P) > 0 for P>1,C
 (P) < 0 for P<1,C
   (P) > 0 (A.1)





      
F (K1)+[ P − 1 − C (P)]SK2 − rK1 +
pre-tax proﬁto f
foreign subsidiary
      
  F (SK2) − PSK 2 − rK2 −T
i,i = s,f
(A.2)
where T i is the ﬁrm’s global tax bill which will diﬀer under separate accounting (i = s)
and formula apportionment (i = f). By analogy, the global net proﬁto fM N E 2i s
π
ai = f (k2)+[ p − 1 − c(p)]sk1 − rk2 +   f (sk1) − psk1 − rk1 − t
i,i = s,f (A.3)
33where the revenue and cost functions have the same properties as those assumed for
MNE1.
Separate accounting
Under separate accounting and source-based taxation, the total tax bills of the two
companies are
T
s = t1 {F (K1)+[ P − 1 − C (P)]SK2} + t2
 




s = t2 {f (k2)+[ p − 1 − c(p)]sk1} + t1
 
  f (sk1) − psk1
 
(A.4.b)
where t1 and t2 are the corporate tax rates in the two countries. (A.4) assumes that the
costs of transfer pricing (e.g., the remuneration of tax lawyers and accountants etc.) are
deductible, whereas the cost of equity ﬁnance is not. Inserting (A.4.a) into (A.2) and
maximizing with respect to K1, K2 and P,o n eﬁnds that the ﬁrst-order conditions for


























(A.5) is a standard expression for the cost of capital. (A.6) and (A.1) imply that the
transfer price P will be set higher or lower than the cost-based price of unity according as
the tax rate in country 2 is higher or lower than the tax rate in country 1. (A.7) shows that
the required marginal pre-tax return on investment in the subsidiary in country 2 includes
three components. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (A.7) is the tax-adjusted cost
of equity ﬁnance. The second term is the after-tax resource cost of providing the extra
services from the parent needed to support an extra unit of capital in the subsidiary. The
third term reﬂects that the provision of these extra services shifts taxable income from
the subsidiary to the parent. This will reduce (increase) the global tax bill if the tax rate
of the parent is lower (higher) than the tax rate of the subsidiary, making investment in
the latter more (less) attractive.



























Let us now investigate the international ﬁscal spillovers in our model. The corporate
tax rate chosen by country 1 will aﬀect economic activity and tax revenue in country 2




P − 1 − C (P)













−1 − (1 − t2)[p − 1 − c(p)]






(1 − t2)c   (p)
> 0 (A.14)
T h es i g no ft h en u m e r a t o ri n( A . 1 1 )w i l lt e n dt of o l l o wt h es i g no ft2 − t1. Indeed,
this will certainly be the case if the C-function is quadratic. This is the basis for the
claim made in the text that a rise in the domestic tax rate will tend to have a positive
(negative) eﬀect on outward FDI in a high-tax (low-tax) country.




f (k2)+[ p − 1 − c(p)]sk1 +   F (SK2) − PSK 2
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The sign of this derivative is generally indeterminate. However, if the initial tax rates
a r et h es a m ei nt h et w oc o u n t r i e s ,w eh a v ep − 1 − c(p)=P − 1 − C (P)=0according



















35Starting out from t1 = t2, a rise in one country’s tax rate is therefore sure to boost
tax revenue in the other country, as multinationals adjust their transfer prices to shift
income out of the country which has raised its tax rate.
Formula apportionment
Under formula apportionment, the starting point for calculating the tax liability of
MNE1 in each country is the company’s global taxable proﬁt( Π)w h i c hi sg i v e nb y
Π = F (K1)+[ P − 1 − C (P)]SK2 +   F (SK2) − PSK 2
= F (K1) − [1 + C (P)]SK2 +   F (SK2) (A.18)
Assuming that the two countries have agreed to apportion the tax base in accordance
with the proportion of the ﬁrm’s total capital stock invested in the two jurisdictions, the
















,K ≡ K1 + K2 (A.19)
where t∗
1 is the weighted average tax rate levied on the global proﬁt of MNE1, and Ki/K
is the proportion of global proﬁt which is taxed in country i. MNE1 will choose K1,
K2 and P so as to maximize its net global proﬁt Πf = Π − rK − Tf.T h e ﬁrst-order
conditions for the solution to this problem can be written as
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Equation (A.20) shows that the ﬁrm will not engage in transfer pricing under FA,
since distorted transfer prices would only generate organizational costs without reducing
the global tax bill, given that the apportionment of taxable proﬁti su n a ﬀected by P.
The unconventional ﬁnal terms on the right-hand sides of equations (A.21) and (A.22)
reﬂect the impact of a rise in investment on the allocation of taxable proﬁts: additional
investment in a high-tax (low-tax) country will drive up (down) the weighted average
tax rate on global proﬁt by causing more of that proﬁt to be allocated to the high-tax
(low-tax) country.
36The general expressions for the derivatives of K1 and K2 with respect to the tax rates
are quite complex. However, if the initial tax rates in the two countries are identical, one















2 S   F  (SK2)
< 0 (A.24)
Thus a rise in country 1’s tax rate will reduce domestic investment as well as outward
FDI, by raising the weighted average tax rate imposed on global proﬁts. From the ﬁrst-















2 f  (k2)
< 0 (A.26)
when t1 = t2 initially.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of country 1’s tax policy on country 2’s revenue. Recalling



















Using (A.27), (A.22), and the analogous ﬁrst-order condition for MNE2, and setting
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where Π is the taxable global proﬁto fM N E 1d e ﬁned in (A.18), and π is the taxable






















37is suﬃcient to ensure that a rise in country 1’s corporate tax rate will have a negative
impact on country 2’s revenue. However, (A.23) through (A.26) provide no guarantee
that this condition will be met.
Spillover eﬀects on social welfare
Recalling that Πai and πai are the after-tax global proﬁts of the two multinationals,




i,i = s,f (A.30)
where a1 and a2 are the respective shares of MNE1 and MNE2 owned by residents of
country 2, and m is the marginal cost of public funds in country 2, introduced to transform
the country’s tax revenue bi into comparable units of private income. For simplicity, we
take a1, a2 and m to be exogenous. By the envelope theorem, the changes in capital
stocks induced by a marginal change in t1 will not aﬀect Πai and πai when companies
have maximized their after-tax proﬁts. Hence SW2 will only be aﬀected by the direct
impact of the change in t1 on Πai and πai,a n db yt h ei m p a c to nbi.U n d e r s e p a r a t e








where Πp ≡ F (K1)+[P − 1 − C (P)]SK2 and   π ≡   f (sk1)−psk1 are the proﬁts subject
to country 1’s tax rate. Since we have seen that ∂bs/∂t1 is likely to be positive because of
income shifting towards country 2, we conclude that the net impact of a higher corporate
tax rate in country 1 on the welfare of country 2 is ambiguous.
Under formula apportionment where Πaf =[ 1− t1 (1 − α) − t2α]Π and πaf =
[1 − t1 (1 − β) − t2β]π,w eg e t
∂SW2
∂t1




A g a i nw es e et h a tt h es i g no ft h eﬁscal spillover eﬀect is uncertain, but if condition
(A.29) is met (so that ∂bf/∂t1 < 0), we can be sure that the spillover eﬀect will be
negative under formula apportionment.
Of course, analogous spillover eﬀects on country 1 will arise in case of an increase in
the tax rate of country 2.
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1. See, for example, Cnossen (2001, section 6.2), Gerard (2002), Giannini (2002), Mintz
(2002), Sørensen (2001b, sections 3.4 and 3.5; 2002a), Sunley (2002), and Weiner (2001,
2002a, 2002b, 2002c).
2. Whether this is good or bad is discussed in section 3.3.
3. This conclusion is derived from a model which abstracts from uncertainty. In a set-
ting with uncertainty where proﬁts ﬂuctuate, the switch to formula apportionment of an
international proﬁts tax base may provide governments with (partial) insurance against
revenue losses from negative country-speciﬁc shocks, since each government will be enti-
tled to a share in the global proﬁts tax base. Because of this international risk sharing
mechanism, governments may become more eager to attract inward FDI by multinational
companies under FA, and for this reason a switch to formula apportionment may indeed
tend to increase international tax competition, as pointed out by Gerard and Weiner
(2003). In a rather diﬀerent setting, Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) ﬁnd that tax com-
petition under separate accounting leads to a constrained eﬃcient outcome, given the
available tax instruments, whereas tax competition with formula apportionment gener-
ates a welfare loss. However, these results are derived from a model where governments
must collect a ﬁxed amount of public revenue and where they can implement residence-
based as well as source-based capital income taxes.
4. This section draws on Sørensen (2002a).
5. For a more detailed review of interest group reactions to the Commission report, see
Weiner (2002c).
396. See Zodrow (1991) for a recent survey of this debate.
7. Several European governments have recently enacted tax cuts without cutting public
expenditure, even though prevailing estimates indicate that their current systems of pub-
lic ﬁnance are quite unsustainable in the long run due to demographic developments, and
despite the fact that some of these countries already violate the so-called Stability Pact
according to which members of the EMU should not run budget deﬁcits in excess of 3
percent of GDP. In national policy debates in Europe, it is often argued that international
economic integration ”necessitates” a domestic tax cut to preserve the ”competitiveness”
of the domestic economy. It is much less common to hear politicians argue that economic
integration requires a cut in public spending in order to ﬁnance the "necessary" tax cuts.
8. It may be too optimistic to expect that transfer pricing regulation would become
totally superﬂuous, since companies may have non-tax incentives to use distorted transfer
prices. For example, in oligopolistic markets a parent company may have a strategic
motive to deliver inputs to its foreign aﬃliates at a low transfer price, since this will
enable the aﬃliates to act aggressively vis a vis competitors, thereby forcing the latter
to go for a smaller share of the world market. In these circumstances, transfer prices will
reﬂect a compromise between the desire to mimimize tax and the strategic desire to deter
oligopolistic competitors. See Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) and Nielsen et al. (2003)
for an elaboration of this view.
9. The absence of a signiﬁcant statistical link between corporate and personal tax rates
may be sample-speciﬁc. Using data for (almost) all the countries in the world, Slemrod
(2001) does in fact ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the levels of the corporate
and the top marginal personal tax rate, although there is no signiﬁcant link between the
changes over time in the two tax rates.
10. Because the labour supply schedules and the savings schedules in the OECDTAX
model are derived from a quasi-linear utility function which eliminates income eﬀects, the
measure of consumer welfare corresponds to the equivalent as well as the compensating
variation. The welfare ﬁgures are averages across the population, which consists of invol-
untarily unemployed as well as employed consumers. With a constant population, this is
40equivalent to adopting a utilitarian social welfare function where all individual utilities
are given equal weight.
11. As demonstrated in Sørensen (2001a), the model may also be given a political econ-
omy interpretation in which the simulated welfare gain represents the utility gain of the
median voter who prefers some redistribution because his level of wealth is below the
average wealth per capita, given the unequal initial wealth distribution.
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